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Irrigation renewal schemes are taking place globally for water conservation and gains in 
agricultural productivity, as competition for water resources increases. The publically-funded re-
newal of irrigation infrastructure is a key platform of water reform in Australia’s Murray-Darling 
Basin; it is considered by some to be a policy that contradicts market-based approaches. In this 
Australian study, we examine an irrigation renewal scheme in northern Victoria resulting from 
a large investment by the State and Federal Governments. The long historical development of 
infrastructure and institutions for irrigation in the region led to technological lock-in and expo-
sure to international terms of trade and climate change. From interviews with water professionals 
involved in the region, three key themes were identified through an adapted grounded theory 
approach: (1) a lack of an appropriate platform for fostering community involvement in what 
was a large-scale investment of public money; (2) issues in the way that water losses and savings 
were calculated; and (3) contradictions in policies for water buyback and irrigation renewal that 
lead to some irrigators being disadvantaged. To better understand the situation, we also applied 
a theoretical lens based on social learning. We conclude that the framing of a water ‘crisis’ was 
used to the benefit of some irrigators in attracting large-scale investment of public funds for 
irrigation renewal. The proposed solution, a technologically-driven irrigation renewal scheme, 
was implemented at a pace that didn’t match the planning horizons for many, leading many to 
exit from irrigated agriculture. Systemic insights for the design and implementation of irrigation 
renewal schemes internationally are highlighted. 
Keywords: Irrigation efficiency; water governance; social learning; water policy, Goulburn-
Murray Irrigation District
1. Introduction
Globally, renewal of irrigation infrastructure for water conservation is becoming 
more common as fresh water supplies dwindle due to increasing population, competition 
from other sectors, changing dietary preferences and climate change (Turral, Svendsen, & 
Faures, 2010; Bogardi et al., 2012). Irrigation renewal is also implemented as a means 
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for increasing agricultural yields, with the goal of producing more food with less water 
(Bjornlund, Nicol, & Klein, 2009). Schultz, Thatte, and Labhsetwar (2005) report that 
many Asian and Latin American countries will require an increase in food production 
on existing agricultural land to meet the demands of growing populations. They suggest 
such an increase is possible provided there is government support for irrigation renewal, 
improvements made to irrigation efficiency, water savings are achieved, and more reliable 
water delivery services are provided.
Designing programs for irrigation renewal that are equitable and acceptable to a range 
of stakeholders have proven challenging, with research indicating several factors that cre-
ate resistance to renewal programs. These include concerns about high upfront costs (Seo, 
Segarra, Mitchell, & Leatham, 2008), an absence of consultative processes (van der Velde 
and Tirmizi, 2004), a lack of financial incentives for adoption (Bjornlund et al., 2009), and 
increased energy consumption to operate modernised systems ( Rodríguez-Díaz, Pérez-
Urrestarazu, Camacho-Poyato, & Montesinos, 2011; Rocamora, Vera, & Abadía, 2013). 
Attempts to address some of these concerns have been tried in different cases. For ex-
ample, an irrigation renewal program in Spain saw the installation of channel control 
devices and a shift from open irrigation channels to closed pressurised pipes, with costs 
shared between irrigators and the government (Plusquellec, 2009). However, the criteria 
of success for such programs differ when viewed variously from hydraulic, economic, 
ecological and social viewpoints. 
It is also argued that conventional approaches to irrigation renewal, where govern-
ments seek to influence irrigators’ decisions to invest in modern irrigation technologies, 
are prone to low levels of adoption (Whittenbury and Davidson, 2009). Such approaches 
are characterised by technological innovations delivered by experts, such as engineers and 
scientists, excluding other options for non-technological improvements in water efficiency 
and overlooking the knowledge of irrigators. So, even when the technological and/or eco-
nomic case for irrigation renewal is strong, programs can fail when they fail to account for 
the experience and knowledge of irrigators and the factors that influence their decisions 
(Whittenbury and Davidson, 2009).
The declining performance of irrigation networks is an issue in many south Asian 
countries, with irrigation renewal on the agenda in China and India; two of the world’s 
largest agricultural producers (Shah, Giordano, & Wang, 2004). A comparative analysis 
of China and Australia concluded that while the biophysical characteristics of irrigated 
agriculture were similar, the governance structures for water resources management are 
quite different (Wei, Langford, Xia, Zhan, & Liu, 2009). However, Wei et al. (2009) sug-
gest that a lot can be learned from the Australian experience, in particular the adoption of 
systemic approaches to improving irrigation efficiency. The case study presented in this 
paper directly addresses these systemic issues and should be applicable in most countries 
undergoing irrigation renewal. 
In Australia, from 1997–2010 the south-eastern part of the country experienced the 
effects of a series of severe droughts (Wei, Langford, Willett, Barlow, & Lyle, 2011), 
which resulted in increasing water scarcity and a growing competition for water resources. 
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Water security was perceived as important for the sustainability and viability of regional 
areas (Schwarz and McRae-Williams, 2009). During this time, the Victorian State Gov-
ernment responded with an irrigation renewal program; the Northern Victoria Irrigation 
Renewal Project (NVIRP - later called GMW Connections). The renewal program aimed 
to improve water efficiency in a major irrigation district (Figure 1) through the moderni-
sation of irrigation infrastructure. In brief, this involved lining major irrigation chan-
nels, upgrading water meters, installing automated flow control structures and retiring 
parts of the irrigation network. The program was funded in two stages amounting to over 
A$2 billion, largely from public funds. The first stage was designed to save an expected 
225 GL (gigalitres) of water, to be shared equally between environmental flows, agri-
cultural production and urban water supply. The second stage was designed to save an 
expected 204 GL of which half would go to environmental flows (water allocated for the 
ecological functioning of rivers). 
This Australian case study has been examined from several different research per-
spectives. Beilin, Sysak, and Hill (2012) explored farmer responses to the northern Victoria 
irrigation renewal against a background of increasing vulnerability to climate change and 
peak oil. From farmers’ perspectives, concerns about the increase in energy use required 
to achieve water conservation were apparent. From a policy perspective, reliance on the 
technological innovation of farmers is perceived to be misguided and can result in mal-
adaptive structural lock-in. Rochford (2012) inquired into the historical and contemporary 
drivers for irrigation development and renewal, highlighting the consequences of the ‘rush 
for results’, centralisation of policy, and critiquing the boundary judgements made in de-
fining the ‘backbone’ on which the modernisation would occur. Wallis and Ison (2011a) 
explored the historical and institutional ‘transitions’ in the multi-level water managing 
Figure 1. Location of the case study region, the Goulburn-Murray Irrigation District, within the Murray-
Darling Basin, Australia. 
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system, highlighting this case of irrigation renewal as a prime example of a shift towards 
more centralised authority in state water policy. Crase, Pawsey, and O’Keefe (2013) con-
cluded that policies for subsidising irrigation renewal are in direct conflict with water 
markets, and undermine the effectiveness of market-based policies for efficient water use. 
Wittwer and Dixon (2013) argued that public investment in this irrigation renewal case is 
likely to be less effective for fostering regional development than spending on education, 
health or other services. In this paper, we report the findings of empirical research with 
water management professionals involved in this Australian case, and draw out systemic 
insights from the governance of the irrigation renewal that can be used in future water 
reform projects nationally and internationally.
2. Research design and theoretical framework
Given the complexity of the northern Victorian irrigation renewal, and the highly 
political and dynamic context in which the program is situated, it is not possible to pres-
ent an exhaustive account in one paper. This case study emerged as a line of inquiry from 
a broader study of historical and contemporary shifts in water governance and the role 
of social learning in transformative change (references de-identified). Methodologically 
we follow on from the earlier papers which outlined our mixed methods approach. Four 
strands of systemic inquiry were mentioned by (references de-identified); this paper re-
ports the outcomes of the fourth and final inquiry. 
This inquiry involved the use of a range of methods, including desktop analysis 
of published literature, news media and historical databases, summaries of board meet-
ing minutes, corporate plans, annual reports, semi-structured interviews and participatory 
workshops. A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with ten stakeholders 
in the Victorian water managing system (coded R1-R10; Table 1) in 2009, and four in-
depth interviews were held with one of these respondents (R10) from 2009–13. The in-
terviews generally lasted for sixty to ninety minutes and were audio-recorded; most were 
transcribed for subsequent thematic analysis. We draw on all data sources to construct this 
study of irrigation renewal. A modified grounded-theory approach was used in the first 
instance to generate emergent themes (Charmaz, 2008); only those themes that exemplify 
new insights and/or relevance beyond the study context are reported. 
In addition to inductive and emergent themes we sought to draw additional sys-
temic insights out of this inquiry situation using a theoretical lens of social learning 
(Figure 2). While understood in a variety of ways (Ison, Blackmore, & Iaquinto, 2013), 
we employ social learning as a theoretical framework that operates as a duality, com-
prising entity and process functioning together much like an orchestra which is both 
an entity and a means of creating a performance from multiple actors and instruments. 
The theoretical and empirical evidence for understanding social learning as a gover-
nance mechanism as well as a transformational process towards concerted action among 
stakeholders is introduced in Ison, Röling, and Watson (2007). The process dimensions 
can be understood as part of a social dynamic in which different knowledges and per-
spectives are valued. 
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Table 1 
Interview respondents
Code Description of respondent
R1 A former senior manager in the rural water industry, prior to privatisation.
R2 A former water reform advocate and senior figure in regional natural resources  
management and irrigation.
R3 A senior manager of a regional authority with a long history of involvement in regional  
water and salinity issues.
R4 A water engineer with a history of involvement in regional irrigation infrastructure.
R5 A senior manager involved in regional irrigation development with a history of involvement  
in salinity issues.
R6 A river manager working in a regional catchment management authority.
R7 A senior official working for a state department on regional issues with a long involvement  
of water managing a state and federal levels.
R8 A former elected representative at the state level involved in regional water reform and salinity.
R9 A scientist with a history of engagement with regional salinity issues.
R10 A water engineer and researcher involved in irrigation infrastructure and a history  
of involvement in catchment management.
Figure 2. The SLIM heuristic showing a set of six variables that enhance or constrain the conduct and emer-
gence of social learning as a result of the interaction of changes in understanding and changes in practice of 
those involved (Source: modified from Collins and Ison, 2009, reproduced with permission).
We used the Social Learning for the Integrated Management and Sustainable Use of 
Water at Catchment Scale (SLIM) heuristic, established through earlier empirical research 
(Steyaert and Jiggins, 2007) as an additional sense-making framework to examine the data 
generated by our inquiry. The SLIM social learning heuristic, as depicted in Figure 2 and 
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applied here, is comprised of six interacting variables: (1) the history of the situation, (2) 
epistemological constraints, (3) institutional arrangements, (4) how stakeholding is built, 
(5) whether adequate facilitation occurs, and (6) learning processes (represented by the 
dotted arrow). 
The history of the situation refers to understanding the past and how it has shaped 
the current context, including through technological and institutional path-dependencies. 
Epistemological constraints refer to limits to the different ways of perceiving and know-
ing the situation, for instance the constraints induced by seeing irrigation renewal only as 
a technical, economic or political activity. Institutional arrangements are rules and norms 
which form the context and background to the situation. This ‘variable’ also concerns 
‘knowledge politics’, i.e., whose knowledge counts. To build stakeholding is to shift situ-
ations of complexity and conflict in a more tractable direction through concerted action, 
creating new understandings and practices as a result (Ison et al., 2007). Facilitation can 
take many different forms, but is essentially understood as a person or object that influ-
ences and enables action. Learning processes, as understood by the arrow in Figure 2, 
emerge as a result of performing the previous five variables; learning is thus understood as 
a social process based on a social theory of learning (Blackmore, Ison, & Jiggins, 2007).
3. Consequences of Irrigation Modernisation 
In 2007, parts of the irrigation network in northern Victoria were approaching 100 years 
of age (Powell, 1989) and were reportedly experiencing water losses in the  order of 30 per 
cent (Rochford, 2012). Earlier irrigation renewal pilot schemes, such as the  Central Goulburn 
Modernisation, were designed and implemented by the regional  water authority Goulburn-
Murray Water to demonstrate water recovery for the environment. These were publically 
funded by the Victorian State Government, as well as The Living Murray program and the 
Water for Rivers initiative. However, in the years following, the prolonged drought created 
a sense of crisis throughout northern Victoria as Australian farm gross domestic product 
(GDP) dropped by 18 percent in 2006/07 (Rayner, Tan, & Ward, 2010) and water shortages 
were experienced not only in northern Victorian irrigation communities but across the city 
of Melbourne (the State Capital). The State Government’s response to ongoing drought was 
to implement a large-scale irrigation renewal scheme in northern Victoria, detailed in a water 
plan in the midst of a particularly dry period (DSE, 2007). According to the stated policy, 
irrigation renewal in northern Victoria was intended to alleviate some of the strain on water 
resources induced by drought through three  strategies: (1) reducing the amount of water used 
for irrigation through improved hydraulic efficiencies; (2) achieving economic efficiencies 
by abandoning parts of the irrigation network; and (3) enabling greater operational efficien-
cies by automating parts of the irrigation network control system. An unstated aim of the 
renewal was to support the viability of an irrigated agriculture industry in the region where 
there were few alternative modes of production:
“If you look at the value of production, the vast majority comes from irrigation and if it’s not 
going to come from irrigation and I don’t know where it’s going to come from unless it comes 
out of factories.” (R5)
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“We’re known as the food bowl of the state, and obviously our community, because we generate 
around twenty-five percent of Victoria’s rural export earnings, it wouldn’t be the case without 
water.” (R6)
The irrigation renewal program set out to change the physical features of the irriga-
tion system through ‘modernisation’, rationalisation’ and ‘reconfiguration’ (DSE, 2009; 
Goulburn-Murray Water, 2013). ‘Rationalisation’ involved decommissioning smaller irri-
gation channels that carry less than 50 ML (megalitres) per day. ‘Modernisation’ involved 
lining irrigation channels with impermeable plastic sheeting, installing automated channel 
control structures, SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) operating systems 
and replacing older Dethridge wheel water meters with flow measurement and control 
gates. ‘Reconfiguration’ involved blocking channel outfalls and reducing the number of 
metered access points. 
NVIRP, the agency created to deliver the irrigation renewal project, presented irriga-
tors with different options depending on where they were located in the irrigation network. 
Those who were connected to the backbone, which are the main irrigation channels ca-
pable of carrying more than 50 ML of water per day, could cooperate (or not) with NVIRP 
to consolidate access points and grant access for new water meters to be installed. Those 
irrigators located off the backbone faced three main options. The first was to take charge 
of their own irrigation works and upgrade their connection to the backbone, which would 
entail great expense. Secondly, they could form a syndicate or consortium with neighbour-
ing farmers to collectively take over the local network, share metering, and stay connected 
to the backbone. Thirdly, they could ‘choose’ to leave irrigation. Overall, the irrigation 
renewal was intended to halve the number of farmers with backbone access. 
There are thus significant social costs entailed by the rationalisation of the irrigation 
system and the associated decommissioning of smaller irrigation channels. These are in 
addition to the substantial economic cost of the irrigation renewal, most of which was 
borne by taxpayers (Crase et al., 2013). Social divisions emerge as farmers with backbone 
access become wealthier while those without access become poorer (R10). The speed 
with which these changes arise is also distressing, as communities have less time to adapt, 
which may result in “people falling into the welfare net” (R4). Farmers with irrigation 
channels that were not designed to carry more than 50 ML of water per day were not in-
tended to have their irrigation infrastructure upgraded as part of the original expenditure 
commitment and instead would need to arrange for independent access to the defined 
backbone (R10). The resulting uncertainty reportedly created substantial distress among 
some of the farmers who own these properties because they are left with little choice but to 
retire from irrigation (R10). To further exacerbate the divide, farmers who were not on the 
backbone or who had not been provided with upgraded water meters were ineligible for 
the Federal Government and NVIRP-funded farm efficiency grant which aimed to reduce 
water losses associated with on-farm water use.
Three themes emerged from the interviews as key narratives that have implications 
for the feasibility of future irrigation renewal projects in Australia and internationally. 
They pertain to the economic, social and environmental well-being of northern Victoria, 
but all of them entailed significant social costs for the irrigation communities affected 
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by the renewal. The themes included: (1) a lack of community involvement; (2) the is-
sue of calculating hydraulic efficiency versus economic efficiency; and (3) contradictions 
between the policies of water buyback for the environment and irrigation modernisation. 
These issues resulted from the halving of the irrigation network and the manner in which 
it was conducted. In each of the following three subsections, respondent views, supple-
mented by other data sources, of these themes are discussed and compared to other rel-
evant water governance literature. 
3.1. Community involvement
The stated intent of the government’s 2007 irrigation renewal policy was that “the 
Government will work closely in partnership with the community to finalise key elements 
of the project” and that the new body created to deliver the project would “work with lo-
cal communities and all levels of government to manage and complete the project” (DSE, 
2007). The language used at this stage emphasised ‘modernisation’ of the irrigation net-
work, with no mention that areas of the network would be ‘rationalised’. 
Community involvement as understood in the inquiry situation did not strictly entail 
engagement between government and the community, but was also among members of 
the irrigation community itself. Community meetings organised by NVIRP were often not 
facilitative (R10); rather, they were opportunities for NVIRP to inform the community of 
its plans, leaving room only for the voicing of grievances. More discussion around a vision 
of the irrigation network could have helped alleviate some of the uncertainty experienced 
by irrigators who were not on the backbone, as one interviewee explained:
“. . . if you had that discussion, which would’ve been pretty heated, and you had some vision of 
what the irrigation area’s going to look like, it would’ve gone a long way.” (R2)
In the irrigation communities of the GMID, there was a perception that NVIRP mainly 
worked one-to-one with irrigators as a tactic to “divide and conquer” (R10). On the one 
hand, there were sensitive issues and privacy laws dictated that discussions were classified 
as ‘commercial-in-confidence’. On the other hand, invoking commercial-in-confidence 
can be detrimental to the community because it can foster a culture of secrecy, dissuading 
neighbours from talking to one another. When irrigators were forced to deal individually 
with NVIRP in tight timelines, collaboration and collective action became impossible. Ad-
ditionally, neighbouring properties in the GMID typically share a channel system, which 
means the decisions made by one farmer directly affects other farmers in the region who 
share the same channel system. If one property is sold, it may devalue the adjacent proper-
ties. Other potential stakeholders, such as local environment groups and tourism operators, 
were also absent from the deliberations. 
Farmers without backbone access felt particularly disenchanted because their op-
tions were to retire from irrigation, join with other farmers to form a syndicate to secure 
a connection to the backbone, or to operate independently and arrange their own supply 
via the backbone, all difficult options (R10). As a result, there were an increasing number 
of properties not serviced by the backbone which meant an increase in the number of 
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stranded assets. While ostensibly irrigators were presented with options, some reportedly 
believed they had no choice but to sell up and get out of irrigation. Had these farmers been 
provided with the time and encouragement to discuss their issues with neighbours, a more 
systemically desirable outcome might have been achieved.
Community involvement was also hindered by the overly generalised nature of the 
irrigation renewal. One report suggested that NVIRP encountered resistance because it 
failed to take into account that farmer support for the irrigation renewal was variable. 
Murdoch, Lourey, Kaine, and Johnson (2009) found that farmer support differed signifi-
cantly depending on their location on the irrigation network, their business requirements, 
and the unique attributes of their farms. Insufficient recognition for this variability was an 
indication of what R10 referred to as the “jelly mould approach” where there is a lack of 
consideration of how local contexts and “social nuances” shapes implementation of engi-
neering projects. The irrigation renewal in northern Victoria illuminates the risks of basing 
the design of engineering projects on the feedback from a small number of landholders, as 
it does not accurately reflect landholder diversity.
The lack of community involvement led to the misrepresentation of irrigators as one 
homogenous group. The following response could be interpreted as a deliberate tactic by 
larger area irrigators to intentionally distort the amount of revenue lost from water price 
rises, as a way to strengthen their own positions.
“The irrigators always appointed the most disadvantaged irrigator in the district to say ‘you can’t 
raise water prices, look what you are doing’. Well the people that benefit the most are the big 
area irrigators. They get a heap of money. They don’t contribute to the system and they surf off 
it in the name of helping this poor guy down the bottom.” (R1)
To put this response into context, the benefits gained by larger enterprises derives 
from the increased delivery reliability of the upgraded network, which is partly paid for 
through higher water prices. The “big area irrigators” (R1) have enjoyed individual suc-
cess due to the lack of a diversity of farmer voices in the design of the NVIRP irrigation 
renewal. The absence of broader community involvement in the irrigation renewal and 
the associated unequal distribution of money, has reduced the potential for success of the 
irrigation renewal overall.
In summary, community involvement was a contentious issue that was poorly de-
signed and rushed. As Ostrom (2011) argued “when farmers have no voice in the design 
of systems that are supposed to help them, we can expect few successes over time”.
3.2. Calculating water losses and savings
Several issues with the calculation of expected hydraulic efficiencies were raised by 
our interviewees. Many of these are already reported by others, for example in an inquiry 
by the Victorian Auditor-General (2010) the Victorian Ombudsman (2011), and also by 
Rochford (2012) and Crase et al. (2013). The economic case for irrigation renewal was 
also contentious, with the original project design not accompanied by a business case 
(Victorian Ombudsman, 2011). Here we summarise and critique some key aspects of the 
hydraulic rationale for the irrigation renewal. 
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There were several contested key assumptions of hydraulic efficiency in the case for 
investment. During drought years, channels were rarely full meaning low rates of seepage, 
but water savings resulting from lining irrigation channels were still calculated based on 
full channels in which seepage rates would be much higher (R10). The decommissioning 
of many of the smaller irrigation and outfall channels complicated the accurate measure-
ment of water savings, since these can still carry water during wetter periods. Additionally, 
many of the water savings were realised through more accurate measurement rather than 
prevention of water loss (Victorian Ombudsman, 2011). 
Preventing water from flowing through outfall channels (usually local creeks) by 
blocking up outfalls was calculated as a water saving, despite some farmers holding li-
censes to productively use outfall water. Outfall water is that which is ordered by an ir-
rigator but cancelled after delivery has begun and allowed to spill into smaller ‘outfall’ 
channels. In modernised irrigation systems there is a view that outfalls are unnecessary. 
Prior to the drought, outfall channels were useful for preventing excess water reaching 
farms as they would enable spillage into nearby creeks, rivers and wetlands. During the 
floods of the GMID that occurred in 2010–11, the extent of flooding was exacerbated by 
the blockage of outfalls, as water that normally would have flowed into receiving bodies 
such as wetlands was delivered to farms in vast quantities (R10).
In summary, there are many uncertainties, in measuring water savings, setting bound-
aries, securing backbone access, assessing the costs and benefits of technology and the fu-
ture consequences of reductions in cultivated land, making a clear assessment of potential 
hydraulic (and economic) efficiencies difficult. Essentially, water loss and subsequent sav-
ings can be measured in different ways, so any attempt at conservation will be shaped by 
the unit of analysis used to determine water loss (Samani and Skaggs, 2008).
3.3. Water policies in conflict
The final theme of the interviews to be discussed is the contradiction between the 
two policies of modernising irrigation infrastructure and government buyback of water 
(see Crase et al., 2013), in which farmers sell their water rights to Australian govern-
ments. Buyback was initiated in 2006 as a way for governments to acquire water for the 
environment, but it raises serious social issues since usually it is the most disadvantaged 
farmers who are selling their water. As one respondent explained, farmers are “not selling 
water because they’re profitable” but simply for “financial survival” (R4). Irrigators who 
sell their water to the government for reallocation to environmental flows are known by 
NVIRP as ‘willing sellers’, yet such a framing is misleading given that:
“The people who are selling up are those that are in greatest strife, and it’s not a willing seller nor 
it is a targeted method, it’s just who you can get the water off cheapest. That leaves behind some 
inherent inefficiencies in the system, which is counter-productive in my view.” (R5)
Thus it would be more accurate to make a distinction between ‘willing’ and ‘forced’ 
sellers within the irrigation community of the GMID (see Alston and Whittenbury, 2011). 
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Some farms are reportedly unprofitable given their locations within the water catchment 
combined with the costs of irrigated agriculture (R4). The irrigation renewal has exacer-
bated this situation, as unprofitable farms become even less valuable since these are also 
the least likely to have access to the backbone. As mentioned earlier, Wittwer and Dixon 
(2013) calculated that the money spent on irrigation renewal throughout the MDB would 
be better spent on services, as this would create three to four times more jobs.
Irrigators are reportedly unsure of what the future land use of areas removed from ir-
rigation will be, what new industries may potentially replace irrigated agriculture, and the 
role of government, both state and federal, in this new situation (R4). It is not only the pace 
of change that is distressing for irrigators, but also its scale. As one respondent claimed:
“The face and nature of irrigated agriculture (across the MDB), it’s going to change substantially 
with climate change, with buy back of water for the environment” (R4). 
Australian government authorities operating at state and federal levels appear to lack 
an appreciation of the local contexts motivating farmers to sell their water, or acknowledge 
that policies which work in isolation may not work in combination. Since the most disad-
vantaged farmers are usually the ones who sell their water, and the farmers who are unable 
to benefit from irrigation renewal are further impoverished by their lack of backbone ac-
cess, the two policies have combined to create noticeable social distress in irrigation com-
munities in the GMID and in the MDB more broadly. There is also evidence that before 
the advent of government irrigation renewal programs, the irrigators were upgrading their 
own infrastructure and keeping the savings:
“Irrigators have invested a lot in improving their efficiency over the years but the water hasn’t 
gone back to the environment, it’s gone to the irrigator and that was part of their cost share.” (R5)
A stated aim of the irrigation renewal was to save water, and yet water savings, in 
the absence of other signals and motivations, are rarely a motivation for farmers to make 
changes to their farms (R10). Motivations for changes are more likely to be for the sake of 
productivity gains, enterprise expansion or succession planning. Resistance to irrigation 
renewal can be interpreted as irrigators defending their stake. NVIRP attempted to manage 
the water resources in the GMID by upgrading the irrigation infrastructure, but overlooked 
the local context and human relationships existing within the irrigation communities of 
the GMID.
4. Social learning analysis
In order to inform the design and implementation of irrigation renewal schemes in 
other international settings, we consider the systemic consequences of governing irriga-
tion renewal in the northern Victoria situation. Here the SLIM social learning heuristic 
provides a useful framework for interpreting how collective action was enhanced, or in 
this case limited, through the set of six elements described earlier. 
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4.1. What the SLIM social learning heuristic reveals
The history of the situation set technological and institutional path dependencies, in 
that the physical infrastructure of the irrigation network and its governing agencies were 
developed as public schemes almost one hundred years prior to the renewal scheme and 
were arguably not fit-for-purpose in recent times (Wallis et al., 2013). One narrative of 
change highlights the long-running drought, climate change, peak oil, and international 
terms of trade and regional change as factors that have prompted a slow decline in the 
viability of irrigated food producing systems in Victoria. The proponents of the northern 
Victoria irrigation renewal (the Foodbowl Modernisation Group) used these and other 
arguments to convince the government to invest public money in infrastructure to extend 
the apparent viability of the system, but arguably made some irrigators better off and some 
worse off. 
Ineffective stakeholding was evidenced by the lack of community input into the ir-
rigation renewal process, leading to community resistance. NVIRP dealt with farmers on 
a one-to-one basis, thus a culture of secrecy was created in which neighbours were dis-
suaded from talking to each other and developing joint responses. Many irrigators might 
have been able to keep their water entitlements had they worked collectively as part of 
an irrigator consortium or syndicate, as irrigators on contiguous properties could have 
collectively organised access to the backbone rather than leave irrigation. Alternatively 
collaborative action may have enabled creative innovations of a social and institutional 
nature to emerge. 
Further antagonism toward NVIRP was a result of inequities created by the renewal 
program as irrigators who were not on the backbone were immediately affected by the 
boundary set for rationalisation of the irrigation network, and then further disadvantaged 
by their ineligibility for government funding to improve on-farm water efficiency. Other 
regional voices were absent from discussions. It was not possible to identify any indi-
vidual or group carrying out a facilitative role, while the interpretation of the irrigation 
renewal process as a strictly technical issue appears to have limited learning and thus sys-
temic transformational processes. Our inquiry reveals the power of deeply held technical 
rationalities of the sort that Rittel and Webber (1973) identified as conserving ‘wicked-
ness’ in public policy situations.
The conflation of economic efficiency with hydraulic efficiency is an example of 
epistemological constraints in which terminology used by government confused stake-
holders and, in some cases, led to questionable engineering designs (e.g. closing outfall 
channels). The use of terms such as ‘efficiency’, ‘modernisation’, ‘rationalisation’, ‘recon-
figuration’, ‘renewal’ and ‘harmonisation’ in the context of hydraulic efficiency are con-
fusing because of their economic connotations, making it difficult to understand just what 
type of efficiency NVIRP were referring to. The concept of the ‘willing’ seller provides 
another example, since farmers who sold their water rights to governments were usu-
ally unwilling (or ‘forced’) but had no other option. Further epistemological constraints 
arose with the assumption that irrigation technology was the answer to the water ‘crisis’. 
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The irrigation renewal was implemented based on the traditional linear ‘transfer of tech-
nology’ model in which the views of experts, such as engineers, were privileged. This 
sentiment is reflected by the Victorian auditor-general, who stated “the decision-making 
process from the concept stage to development of a service requirement lacked transpar-
ency and rigour” (Victorian Auditor-General, 2010). Alternatively framing the situation, 
for example as regional development, could have seen a broader range of stakeholders and 
perspectives in conversation about the future of the region and the possibilities created 
from the substantial investment of public funds.
The institutions developed to deliver the renewal scheme were added into an al-
ready complex mix of regional, state and federal arrangements (Wallis and Ison, 2011b). 
Changes to various institutional arrangements have influenced the irrigation renewal pro-
cess, most notably at the Federal and State levels including the Murray Darling Basin 
Cap (a basin-wide limit to diversions), unbundling (separation of water from land) and 
transferable entitlements (water trading). Anderies, Ryan, and Walker (2006) highlighted 
the implications of, at the time, the institutional arrangements relating to catchment so-
cial-ecological system resilience in northern Victoria (specifically the Goulburn-Broken 
Catchment). They conclude that a drive to agricultural efficiency might achieve higher 
outputs from irrigated dairy, but would make the system more vulnerable to wetter periods 
(in relation to salinization, but also as subsequently seen in the 2010–11 floods). Some in-
stitutional arrangements have delivered benefits; irrigators recognise the value that trans-
ferable entitlements yielded over the past thirteen difficult years, as did our respondents, 
captured in this quote by R3, “I’d say in my time the separation of land and water and 
establishing a water market has been the finest bit of public policy”. Future institutional 
arrangements for climate change adaptation need to relate to institutions in the water sec-
tor (Dinar and Jammalamadaka, 2013) to ensure systemically desirable transformation in 
the whole region. 
4.2. Issues the SLIM social learning heuristic may conceal
The SLIM social learning heuristic does not explicitly mention power relations, al-
though we understand power as running through all of the variables: history, institutions, 
facilitation, epistemology, stakeholding and learning processes. In earlier work (reference 
deidentified) we have drawn on John Heron’s modes of facilitation, which include (1) the 
hierarchical mode or ‘power over’; (2) the co-operative mode or ‘power with’; and (3) the 
autonomous mode or ‘delegated power to’ (Heron, 1999). Another framework by Hardy 
(1996) draws attention to three ‘types’ of power: the power of resources, process and of 
meaning. With these understandings, the design and governance of the irrigation renewal 
in northern Victoria displayed a strong hierarchical mode of facilitation and exerted the 
power of resources and process to achieve their goals. Importantly it is not enough to 
categorize power but to seek modes of praxis (theory informed practical actions) that ad-
dress all of the SLIM ‘variables’ systemically and contextually so as to generate effective 
performances that are equitable and ethical (Ison and Wallis, 2011).
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For example, the Victorian Ombudsman’s (2011) report found that an irrigator lobby 
group Foodbowl Unlimited provided the then Treasurer with a proposal to upgrade irriga-
tion infrastructure. This was an interesting case of political dynamics, as these negotia-
tions apparently bypassed the minister and department responsible for water policy, as 
well as reducing the open participation of a range of water users. The planning phase 
that followed was unclear and reportedly poorly documented, with the end result that the 
northern Victorian irrigation renewal was announced as policy before a business case was 
produced. This was hardly ethical or equitable. 
In summary, we claim that the SLIM social learning heuristic is both a useful in-
terpretive framework that could equally be used for policy design in future to address 
the sorts of issues we identify in this case of irrigation renewal. In this case, combining 
systemic with systematic approaches to planning is critical for both transparent investment 
of public funds, but also for desirable regional transformation. In designing irrigation re-
newal programs for systemically desirable outcomes (i.e. that benefit a region, not just the 
hydraulics), the elements of the SLIM heuristic need attention, interpretation and enact-
ment in contextual, ethically defensible, ways. 
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, we examined the irrigation renewal in northern Victoria through an 
adapted grounded theory approach as well as through the lens of a social learning theoreti-
cal framework. A key background dilemma of the situation was that the authority in charge 
of irrigation renewal aimed for a rapid delivery of outcomes, working with irrigators on 
an individual basis to roll-out infrastructural upgrades to the water delivery ‘backbone’. 
Irrigators had no choice about participating; this mode of practice was imposed on them. 
Farmers were pressured to make immediate decisions about their properties in unrealistic 
time frames, on matters of significance to generational planning and farm succession. 
We claim that governance of irrigation renewal programs globally needs to acknowledge 
the seriousness of such decisions and act in a facilitative role by creating opportunities 
for farmers to talk with one another – in essence to have the opportunity to become co-
inquirers or co-designers (Jones, 2014). The importance of facilitation and stakeholder 
platforms for working through perceived water conflict is highlighted in the international 
literature, such as in Warner (2007), but has been seriously lacking from program design 
in northern Victoria. We would contend that having the support of only some farmers, 
notably those who stood to gain the most from the irrigation renewal, does not create suffi-
cient stakeholding to achieve equitable outcomes and leaves the investment and innovation 
exposed to systemic failure at a later date. 
Navigating a successful path for the future of irrigation was a difficult prospect to 
consider in NVIRP situation and the resulting program of investment was politically- 
motivated, technology-centric and fast-paced. In the renewal, local knowledge was largely 
ignored, and instead the insights provided by experts were privileged. In this context, and 
from our interviews, we found that concerted learning opportunities were limited due to 
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inadequate facilitation, a misrepresentation of stakeholders and confusing and compli-
cated institutional arrangements. Of particular significance were the frame divergences 
between ‘willing’ and ‘forced’ sellers of water and the primary framing of the investment 
as a technical engineering issue. The irrigation renewal could also have been interpreted 
as a means to secure water resources for the state of Victoria or as an attempt to maintain 
current levels of economic output from agricultural production and export. 
In similar situations internationally, the aim of future water reform projects should 
be to have in place a well-designed and inclusive planning process, which in its enactment 
attends to the various ‘elements’ of social learning (Figure 2). This would give farmers in 
neighbouring properties a chance to resolve their own irrigation issues, and could reduce 
the number of stranded assets (farms surrounded by abandoned properties lacking irriga-
tion infrastructural upgrades) since it would give farmers the chance to organise back-
bone access with their neighbours. More importantly, such a process would incorporate 
farmer consultation and input and devise ethical means to identify who were genuine, 
willing sellers, thus giving communities a sense of pride. This would minimise the break-
down of social capital and ensure thriving communities based on the joint development 
of institutional arrangements that are considered a form of social capital (Brondizio, 
Ostrom, & Young, 2009). To incorporate community perspectives, irrigation renewal needs 
to be reframed from an engineering issue to one that acknowledges community perspec-
tives, which would then require more community involvement to address what the future 
of the region should be and how it should be managed (Wei, Ison, Colvin, & Collins, 
2012). Opportunities for enhanced mutual learning between those at the local level, such 
as the irrigators and local organisations such as catchment management authorities and 
local government, and organisations at the state level were missed. In future we advocate 
the need for systemic approaches to water governance, including irrigation renewal, that 
start with a broader, multi-perspective framing of the situation to be ‘improved’.
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